Freedom To Veto

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Complexity Digest 2004.07 - 16
http://comdig.unam.mx/index.php?id_issue=2004.07#15239
Feb. 17, 2004

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Freedom To Veto, Social Choice & Welfare
 









Abstract: (...) it has been assumed that being in a position to choose from more
options is preferred to having fewer options. Combining a dictator game (a
no-choice situation for the receiver) and an ultimatum game (the receiver can
choose between two options) we investigated whether receivers prefer to have
some freedom of choice (...) even in the presence of monetary incentives to
choose otherwise. The experimental results show that a strong majority of
players is not willing to give up the option to veto without monetary incentives
to do so. The higher the monetary incentives the more players give up their veto
power.
Source: Freedom To Veto[
http://www.springerlink.com/app/home/contribution.asp?wasp=e7vd27d8h43rrge029by&referrer=parent&backto=issue,2,16;journal,1,33;browsepublicationsresults,447,515;
], M. Ahlert - ahlertwiwi.uni-halle.de, A. Cr�ger, DOI:
10.1007/s00355-003-0273-3, Social Choice and Welfare, Feb. 2004
Contributed by Pritha Das - prithadas01yahoo.com

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