

National University of Mexico

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Computational models of thinking

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
www.princeton.edu/~psych/PsychSite/~phil.html

GOALS OF THE TALK

- How do humans think and reason?
- Illustrate role of computer models in development of theories.
- Interdisciplinary nature of cognitive science: logic, linguistics, computer science & AI, experimental psychology, and neuroscience.


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A TAXONOMY OF THINKING



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TAXONOMY CONTINUED



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AN ALTERNATIVE TO TURING TEST

- Turing said: Don't ask can machines think, but ask can you distinguish between machine and human?
- Cognitive science: develop a theory of thinking, test it experimentally, and implement it in a computer model.
- *What* is computed?
How is it computed?
Where in the brain is it computed?

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AN INFERENCE

- A man: 'Does this train go to Ickenham?'
- Phil knew:
If the train goes to Uxbridge then it goes to Ickenham. [from Map]
The train goes to Uxbridge.
∴ The train goes to Ickenham.
- Phil: 'Yes!' [Doors closed.]

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ANOTHER INFERENCE

Some engineers knew:

- If the experiment is to continue then the turbines must be rotating fast enough
- The turbines are not rotating fast enough.

They went ahead with the experiment.

[Chernobyl disaster]

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TWO FORMS OF INFERENCE

- If there's a square then there's a triangle.
There's a square. What follows?
Therefore, there's a triangle [17 out of 19]
- If there's a square then there's a triangle.
There's not a triangle.
Therefore, there's not a square [9 out of 19]
"Nothing follows." [9 out of 19]

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WHY LOGIC CANNOT BE A THEORY OF REASONING

- People draw their own conclusions from premises (with systematic biases).
- They say "nothing follows" from such premises: *It is raining. 3 is a prime.*
- From any set of premises, logic implies infinitely many valid conclusions, e.g.:
It is raining and 3 is a prime, or it is sunny.

No sane person makes such an inference.

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THEORY OF MENTAL LOGIC

- Mind equipped with formal rules of inference (of which we are unaware).
- Example of proof:
If a square then a triangle.
Not a triangle.
1. Suppose: a square.
2. \therefore a triangle (modus ponens: if p then q; p; \therefore q)
3. \therefore a triangle & not a triangle (conjunction)
4. \therefore Not a square (reductio ad absurdum)

Example from Rips, L.J. (1994) *The Psychology of Proof*. MIT Press.

Complete computer implementation is not in public domain. Professor Phil Johnson-Laird, Princeton University, 2002

EFFECTS OF CONTENT

- *If Bill is in Rio then he is not in Sweden.*
He is in Sweden. What follows?
Enhances: \therefore *He is not in Rio.* (92%)
- *If Bill is in Brazil then he is not in Rio.*
He is in Rio. What follows?
Impedes: \therefore *He is not in Brazil.* (34%)
- Moral: mind does not use formal rules.

Results from J-L & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002) Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics and inference. *Psychological Review*, 109, 646-678.

THEORY OF MENTAL MODELS

- People envisage possibilities: each mental model represents a possibility.
- Mental models represent only what is true. The principle of 'truth'.
- An inference is **valid** iff it holds in all models of the premises.
- Counterexamples show that inference is **invalid**: a possibility in which premises hold but conclusion doesn't.

J-L (2001) Mental models and deduction. *Trends in Cognitive Science*, 5, 434-442.

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COMPUTER IMPLEMENTATION

- COMMON LISP (lists, arrays)
- Stage 1: Parse sentence + compositional semantics.
- Stage 2: Check relation between sentence and current models: valid or inconsistent.
- Stage 3: Else update existing set of models.
- Four levels of expertise, from novice to AI.

J-L & Savary, F. (1999) Illusory inferences: a novel class of erroneous deductions.

Cognition, 71, 191-229. Program in public domain. Phil Johnson-Laird, Princeton University, 2002.

COMPOSITIONAL SEMANTICS

- Meaning of an expression depends on meaning of its parts and their syntactic interrelations – Frege (1892), Tarski (1936).
- Each syntactic rule has a corresponding semantic rule (Montague, 1974); standard in design of compilers, but the programming language, CHLF-5, was an exception.
- As parser uses a rule to analyze the syntax of a constituent, it calls the corresponding semantic rule to build interpretation

SENTENTIAL CONNECTIVES

Connective Interpretation as set of possibilities

<i>A and B.</i>	a	b
<i>A or B, not both.</i>	a	$\neg b$
	$\neg a$	b
<i>If A then B.</i>	a	b
	$\neg a$	b
	$\neg a$	$\neg b$

But, *A* and *B* can be sentences containing connectives. Expert level of program: AI.

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SYNTACTIC RULES

- A “context-free” grammar with recursive rules of the following sort:-

Sentence \rightarrow variable

Sentence \rightarrow *not* sentence

Sentence \rightarrow sentence *and* sentence

Sentence \rightarrow sentence *or* sentence


Sentence \rightarrow *if* sentence *then* sentence

Variable $\rightarrow A, B, C, \dots$ [A lexicon]

- Parser needs ‘stack-like’ memory (Chomsky’s 1959 proof).


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A SHIFT-AND-REDUCE PARSER



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If A then B or if not A then B



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<i>MENTAL MODELS</i>	
<u>Connective</u>	<u>Mental models</u>
<i>A and B.</i>	a b
<i>A or B, not both.</i>	a b
<i>If A then B.</i>	a b ... ← implicit model

• Represent what is true, not what is false.

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<i>MENTAL MODELS FOR:</i>	
<i>If A then B or else if not A then B</i>	
• Program at lowest level of expertise:	
<i>If A then B:</i>	<u>True</u> a b ...
<i>or [not both]</i>	
<i>if not A then B:</i>	$\neg a$ b ...
<i>Or of the two sets of possibilities:-</i>	
	a b $\neg a$ b

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<i>AN ILLUSORY INFERENCE</i>	
<i>If there is an ace in the hand then there is a king or else if there isn't an ace in the hand then there is a king.</i>	
<i>There is an ace in the hand.</i>	
What follows?	
Nearly everyone says: <i>there is a king.</i>	

J-L & Savary, F. (1999) Illusory inferences: a novel class of erroneous deductions. *Cognition*, 71, 191-229. Program in public domain.
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<i>AN ANALYSIS</i>	
• <i>If ace then king or else if not ace then king.</i>	
• <u>Mental models</u>	<u>AI models</u>
ace king	ace \neg king
\neg ace king	\neg ace \neg king
• <i>There is an ace.</i>	
• <u>Mental model</u>	<u>AI model</u>
ace king	ace \neg king

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<i>A VARIANT</i>	
• Only one of the following two assertions is true about cards in a hand:	
<i>If ace then king.</i>	
<i>If not ace then king.</i>	
• The following is definitely true:	
<i>There's an ace.</i>	
• What follows?	

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<i>ANOTHER SORT OF ILLUSION</i>	
• Only one of the following assertions is true about a particular hand of cards:	
<i>There is a king or an ace, or both.</i>	
<i>There is a queen or an ace, or both.</i>	
<i>There is a jack or a ten, or both.</i>	
Is it possible that there is an ace in the hand?	
• 99% of Princeton students: "Yes".	


From Goldvarg, Y., & J-L (2000) Illusions in modal reasoning. *Memory & Cognition*, 28, 282-294.
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AN INFERENCE FOR A JURY

- The victim was stabbed to death in a cinema.
- The suspect was on an express train to New York city at the time of the stabbing.
- What conclusion would you draw?

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INDUCTIVE INFERENCES



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
AN INFERENCE

- More than half the people in the room speak Spanish.
- More than half the people in the room speak English.
- Does it follow that more than half the people in the room speak Spanish and English?
- Even 7 year-olds say: "No".

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COUNTEREXAMPLES

- Reasoners use counterexamples, i.e., model or diagram of possibility consistent with premises but not with conclusion:



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
BRAIN IMAGING

- Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) reveals active regions of brain.
- Comprehension depends on left-hemisphere.
- Reasoning depends on right-hemisphere (non-linguistic regions, which may mediate spatial processes).
- Study compared reasoning with, and without, search for counterexamples & mental math.

Kroger, J., Cohen, J.D., and J-L. (2002) A double dissociation between logic and mathematics. Under submission.

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BRAIN ACTIVITY IN SEARCH FOR COUNTEREXAMPLES



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WHAT, HOW, WHERE?

- What is computed in reasoning? conclusion that holds in set of possibilities consistent with premises.
- How? Compositional semantics yields *mental* models of premises. Induction uses general knowledge.
- Where? Comprehension in left hemisphere; significant right hemisphere activity for reasoning.

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CONCLUSIONS

- Humans think and reason by manipulating mental models.
- Computer implementation of theories: prevents theorists assuming too much. can yield surprising predictions (illusions).
- Cognitive science is interdisciplinary: takes ideas from theory of computability, logic, compiler design, linguistics, and many other disciplines.

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